

SPEECH

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OF

woman and

HON. T. H. BAYLY, OF VIRGINIA,

1810 - 1856

ON

THE HARBOR BILL,

AND IN REPLY TO THE HON. C. HUDSON, OF MASSACHUSETTS,

ON THE

CORN TRADE OF ENGLAND.

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1846.

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HARBORS AND RIVERS.

The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the bill making appropriations for certain Rivers and Harbors—

Mr. BAYLY rose and said: I have very little to say, Mr. Chairman, upon the bill before the committee. The subject is one with which the country, for a long time, has been familiar, and the opinions of most persons are made up in reference to it. I have never thought that this Government had power to carry on a system of internal improvements; and I have always been of opinion that it would be inexpedient, if the power existed.

The Government of the United States is one of delegated powers; and by the provisions of the Constitution itself, it is declared that all powers not delegated are reserved to the States or the people. The Constitution not only contains a delegation of powers, but also of means to execute them; and the delegation of one class of means, according to the most familiar rules of construction, excludes the idea of an intention to delegate any other. These are positions which no Republican, who understands the first principles of his creed, will dispute. Then the inquiry arises: Is the power to carry on a system of internal improvements to be found among the powers expressly granted to Congress? This is not pretended. Is it enumerated among the specified means to execute the granted powers? Neither is this pretended. It is not granted in express terms either as an end or a means. And it was not inadvertence that it is so. On the contrary, a motion was made in the Convention which framed the Constitution to grant the power, and it failed. And now gentlemen seek to confer upon the Government, by construction, what the Convention refused to confer by express grant!

But gentlemen do not contend that the power to carry on a system of internal improvements is conferred by express grant. They claim it as an implied power. There are two tests of implied powers, either of which is fatal in this case. Upon

every principle of construction applicable to our Constitution, an implied power must not be a distinct, independent, and substantive prerogative, but it must be secondary; such as it is fair to presume was meant to be conferred by implication. Is the power in question of that secondary character? Is it not a distinct, independent, and substantive prerogative? It seems to me that there cannot be two opinions on this point. The second test to which I refer is this: A power claimed by implication, as a means of executing a power expressly granted, must, in its nature, be inferior or subordinate to means expressly granted to execute the same power. For you cannot suppose when the Convention granted expressly inferior means, that they meant to confer, by implication, those in their character superior. To show that the power in question is not of this inferior class, I have nothing to do but to refer to the Constitution, which is full of enumerated means of executing granted powers, of a vast deal less consequence than the one now claimed.

Let us examine this question a little more in detail. The power in question is sought to be derived from various sources. In the language of Mr. Clay, "it is a vagrant power"—now seeking a habitation in one clause of the Constitution, now in another, and, in truth, having a legitimate home in none. Not to detain the committee in an examination of all the fanciful sources from which gentlemen attempt to derive this power, let us examine the two from which it is most generally thought to flow.

The first is the power to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States."

It is insisted, that under this clause Congress can do anything that can be done by money, which in its opinion will provide for the general-welfare. In other words, the power is sought to be derived under what is well known as "the general-welfare"

doctrine. There is a very short answer to this whole doctrine, which is perfectly conclusive. The Constitution was designed as a restraint on Congress; to fetter discretion; to confine it within narrow and prescribed limits: in a word, as an exact measure of the powers of Congress. But this doctrine makes "the discretion of Congress, and not the Constitution, the measure of its power." If this doctrine is true, nearly every other clause of the Constitution is surplusage; for there is very little pertaining to Government which may not be done under the sweeping power to provide for the general welfare. But there is nothing superfluous in the Constitution. The words in question, so far from being designed as an enlargement of the powers of Congress, were designed as a restriction. Congress not only may not do whatever it may fancy will provide for the general welfare, but it may not even exercise the powers expressly granted for any other purpose than to promote THE GENERAL welfare. The powers granted are not to be used for special, but general purposes—not for State, but for national purposes. This view alone is fatal to the bill before the House, as it will be to any one which will be introduced with any prospect of success. Local appropriations will have to be made to secure strength enough to carry any bill.

The internal-improvement power is also claimed under the clauses authorizing Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;" and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."

The word commerce, at the time it was used in the Constitution, had a received and recognised meaning. It meant "trade, traffic," in an enlarged sense. It meant a *pursuit*, rather than a thing. It is the *business* of commerce, and not the *means* by which it is carried on, which Congress has a right to regulate. Under the power to regulate commerce, Congress may prescribe the terms upon which trade may be conducted with foreign nations, but it cannot prescribe the medium through which it is carried on. It cannot say to a merchant that he shall export his goods in a sloop and not in a schooner—in a sail-vessel and not in a steamboat. But if it were otherwise, I would still deny the power in this case. The provision of the Constitution confers power only over things in existence; and so, if we concede to it the utmost latitude of *regulation*, it does not give the power of *creation*. I deny that Congress can regulate the *means* of commerce. But suppose it can, that confers no power to *create* them. I may admit, for the argument, that Congress may regulate the shipping of merchants; but does it thereby acquire the power to furnish them with shipping at its own expense? I deny that Congress has the authority to furnish ships and wagons to carry our produce to market; but it has as much power to do that as it has to furnish canals and boats, railroads and cars. Gentlemen also claim the power in question under the clause authorizing Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the granted powers. A stronger argument against

this whole doctrine of power by implication could not be devised than from this provision of the Constitution. If there is any principle of universal application, it is, that where a power is explicitly delegated, the means necessary for its execution is delegated also; and yet so averse was the convention which framed the Constitution to powers by implication, that even in this case they resorted to an express grant. Now, sir, in all the discussions relative to the clause under consideration, it seems to me that there is a great confusion of ideas. The arguments advanced tend to show that the exercise of the power claimed is necessary for the welfare of the people—for the Government. This might be admitted, and yet it would not advance them one step in the argument. To get power to pass laws under the clause we are discussing, you must show that they are necessary *to the power*; and that without them the power cannot be executed. Whenever you can do that—whenever you can show that the passage of any particular law is necessary to give *vitality* to a granted power, without the passage of which it would be dormant, then I grant you have authority to pass it. The necessity must be co-existent with the power. But when you have shown that the exercise of any given power is very expedient or convenient for the Government—nay, I will go further, and say, when you show that it is absolutely necessary for the Government to possess such a power, you have not advanced a step towards showing that the Government in fact possesses it. All you have done in such a case is, to demonstrate the propriety of amending the Constitution, so as to confer the power, express provision for which is made. And in the very fact of providing it, the framers of the Constitution showed that they contemplated a state of things in which additional powers would be needed by the Government, that could not be derived in any other manner. They had no idea of deriving additional powers by the mode of construction now contended for.

As an illustration of the sort of necessity which will authorize the passage of a law for carrying into execution a granted power, I will take the case of the Mint. Congress is empowered to coin money. It cannot do this without a mint. It is not possible; the necessity is inherent. It is independent of circumstances. It existed the day the Constitution was adopted; it will exist forever. Thus construed, you make the Constitution what it was designed to be—a stable and fixed thing. But construe it as gentlemen would persuade us, and you make it anything else—as changing as fickle circumstances.

But not satisfied with the argument derived from the Constitution itself, gentlemen resort to precedent, and they refer particularly to the establishment of lighthouses. The power of the Government to establish lighthouses is very questionable. Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison both so regarded it. They did not derive the power to erect them from the power to regulate commerce. They referred it to the power to maintain a navy. Lighthouses were considered as necessary for that purpose as dock-yards, power to construct which is recognised by the Constitution to be in Congress; and the power in the case of lighthouses was con-

sidered as also recognised in the same clause, under the head of "*other needful buildings*." The language of the Constitution is, "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and *other needful buildings*." The connexion in which these last words are used shows that "*the other needful buildings*" referred to such as were in the same category with dock-yards, and needful to the army and navy; and lighthouses were considered as belonging to this class.

A more striking illustration of the mischief of relying upon precedent, by which the abuse of to-day is made the law of to-morrow, could not well be produced than this case affords. In the case of lighthouses, a doubtful power is exerted; this is made the precedent for one still more so; and this, again, is made a precedent, until, by this system of heaping Pelion upon Ossa, you destroy everything like limitation of power in the Government.

But, sir, the power to construct internal improvements is not only not granted in the Constitution, but it is inconsistent with its spirit. *Uniformity* is a characteristic of the Constitution. "All duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Naturalization and bankrupt laws shall be *uniform*. "No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another." "Representation and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers."

These last provisions were designed to insure equal advantages and to provide against unequal favors among the several States. But what folly it was in the framers of the Constitution to take so much pains to secure uniformity in raising revenue, if they designed to permit inequality into its distribution. Practically the same result follows. There is as much partiality and injustice in the one case as in the other. Inequality is inherent in this whole system; it is the very law of its existence. If no State or section could receive more under it than its share—if no State could receive more than she contributes, none would care anything about it; for they would only get back their own, diminished by the cost of collection and disbursement. If no State could receive more than it contributes, it would be better for it to collect and disburse for itself. If it does receive more than its just proportion, other States will receive less, which would be unjust. So this is a system which, to make it desirable to any you must make it unjust to some. The provisions of this bill show the inequality of the system. It appropriates a million and a half of dollars; and in the Southern States, fifty thousand dollars for Savannah, and twenty thousand dollars for Charleston,* comprise the whole of the appropriations from the banks of the Potomac to the Gulf of Mexico! And this inequality has existed whenever the system has been in operation, and it will continue as long as it exists. The facts upon this head presented by

the gentleman from Alabama, [Mr. YANCEY,] are conclusive.*

But, sir, I not only insist that this system is unconstitutional, but that, if it were otherwise, it would be inexpedient. This Government could not wisely exercise such power. The country over which we legislate is so extensive, that it is impossible for us to possess the local information necessary for the judicious exercise of such power. Suppose an appropriation is asked for in Maine, or Wisconsin: how can I know anything personally of the propriety of it? Shall I rely upon the Representative? He will be interested in misleading me.

The natural tendency of such a system is to extravagance. Such was the case in the States where there were guards against it, which do not exist here. There was the better local information; there was the more direct responsibility growing out of smaller constituencies; there was the safeguard of direct taxation. In the States there was no interest in favor of expenditure, except that which was to profit directly by it. But it is very different here. Allied with the interest to be directly benefited by the expenditure is the tariff interest which is to profit indirectly by it. With all the powerful guards to which I have referred in the States, the system ran into profligacy and ruin. If the sys-

* Mr. YANCEY said:

"In the third volume of Executive Documents, 2d session 23d Congress, I find the following facts, exhibiting the amount of money disbursed by the General Government to the two sections of the Union—North and South—for purposes of internal improvement, between the years 1791 and 1833:

To the States north of Maryland.....\$3,117,206 27
To the States south of Maryland, and including that State..... 878,709 14

"This array of figures shows that, in the course of forty-two years, fourfold the amount of money was disbursed at the North than was expended at the South; though our coast, in round numbers, is four hundred miles the longest.

"In my comparisons, I shall also include the State of Ohio, as the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BRINKERHOFF] appeared to boast of the magnanimity of his State in asking for so little. During that time there was expended, for purposes of internal improvement in the State of Ohio, though a new State, \$859,124—a sum within \$20,000 of what the whole South, with an exposed coast of four thousand miles, had received!

"But this is not all that this favored region—the North—received in that period. In the above-mentioned items are not included the following:

To Cumberland road.....	\$3,723,530 63
To Ohio and Chesapeake canal.....	999,000 00
To Louisville and Portland canal.....	233,500 00
To Chesapeake and Delaware canal.....	200,000 00
To improving Mississippi and Ohio rivers	394,513 33

"Of this enormous sum, amounting to \$5,550,543 96, not more than a million, it is fair to presume, from the direction of the works, was expended south of Baltimore.

"From the Treasury Department I have gleaned the following statement, showing the amount of money disbursed for harbors, rivers, roads, and canals, to the same divisions of country since 1830. It is true the statement includes three years, the expenditures for which are included in the statement given above; but as this operates more against the South than the North, it will not serve to vitiate my argument:

To the States north of Maryland.....	\$7,075,933 55
To the States south, including Maryland.....	2,141,702 50
To the District of Columbia.....	699,306 00
To the State of Ohio.....	1,940,319 96

"From the above table, then, it will be seen that the North has received, with less extent of coast, \$4,934,231 05, from 1830 to 1845, more than the South has for purposes of internal improvement; or more than threefold over her less favored sister."

* The appropriation for Charleston was afterwards stricken out.

tem is introduced here, what will be its end? Can any one doubt?

This system will enormously increase Governmental patronage. Heretofore it has been confined to individuals; and thus confined, we all know the influence of it. Introduce this system, and it is extended to districts—to States. Suppose the Democratic party in the ascendency, or the Whig, and it will be the same with both. The Democratic party is in the ascendency. A district is Whig. It gets no appropriation. An election is to come on in another. It is important to carry it; and it gets an appropriation. And look what enormous discretion this bill confers upon the Executive. There is appropriated for the improvement of the Ohio river, above the falls at Louisville, \$80,000—below the falls, and the Mississippi, Missouri, and Arkansas, \$240,000. For harbors, on Atlantic coast, \$20,000,—no place named for this expenditure. Is this such discretion as ought to be conferred upon the Executive? It is so large as in effect to confer upon it the power of legislation. But, sir, I will not pursue this discussion farther. My main design is to reply to the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Hudson.]

But permit me to remark, before I dismiss the subject, that the insidious character of the system is such—it addresses itself so powerfully to the sordid interests of the country—it has in consequence implanted in it so much vitality, that it has revived again after five Executive vetoes. I greatly fear, like a cat, it has nine lives, and that it will take nine vetoes to kill it.

When, Mr. Chairman, pending this bill, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Hudson] commenced his remarks upon the tariff, he was called to order, upon the ground that the subjects of the tariff and internal improvements were distinct. But the Chair decided that the gentleman was in order. An appeal was taken from the decision of the Chair, and it was sustained by a large majority, the party friends of the gentleman voting in the affirmative. I think the decision was correct. The two subjects are closely allied; and the success of one depends very much upon the success of the other. Indeed, I have always thought that the tariff question was more emphatically fought on bills appropriating revenue than upon those raising it. The country universally acquiesces in the propriety of raising the necessary revenue by imposts. If, therefore, our expenditures are large, our tariff must be high. So, on the other hand, it is believed that this nation will never submit to collect more money from the people than is necessary to meet the expenditures. If, therefore, the expenditures are moderate, the tariff must be low. The friends of the protective policy see this; and hence you will find few, if any of them, voting against this bill, or indeed any other appropriating money. And here permit me to remark, that this is one of my strongest objections to the tariff policy. It enlists a large interest in the country in favor of lavish expenditure, which, but for it, would be the strongest advocate for economy. I feel justified in saying this; for if it was not his interest to be extravagant in the public expenditures, the New Englander would belie his character if he was not a stickler for economy in his public as he is in his private life.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Hudson] has gone into a very minute examination of the effects which the adoption of the proposed modification of the English corn-laws will have upon our agricultural pursuits, and the influence it ought to exert upon our own commercial legislation. He has attempted to show that the agriculturist will not be benefited; and that so far from its inducing us to relax our restrictive system, it affords additional inducements to adhere to it.

The district which I have the honor to represent is almost exclusively agricultural. I am myself a farmer, and depend—as do nearly the whole of my constituents—upon the produce of the farm for support. Our great staples are Indian corn, wheat, and oats—the importance of the crops, standing in the order I have named them. In this respect, as shown by the census, my district is a fair prototype of the farming, as contradistinguished from the planting portions of the Union. My constituents, having a deep interest in the questions discussed by the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Hudson,] will very naturally desire to know the views of their Representative concerning them. I have therefore seized upon the first opportunity of making them known. And I am the more anxious to do this, as I consider those of the gentleman, though most erroneous and unsound, yet specious, and calculated to deceive. To such, however, as have extensive access to official documents, and the industry to explore their dry details, the task of exposing them is easy, as I shall attempt to show. But before I come to examine the facts and calculation of the gentleman, I desire to make a few preliminary observations.

In these tariff discussions, notwithstanding the strange features which they constantly present, nothing has struck me more forcibly than the kind and paternal solicitude with which gentlemen, not themselves farmers, or representing farming constituencies, undertake to instruct us in our true interests. To hear some of these gentlemen, themselves manufacturers, and representing manufacturers, you would think that all their solicitude was for the welfare of the agriculturist.

It is doubtless very incorrigible in us not to show a becoming gratitude, and very inconsiderate not to heed such disinterested teaching. But their arguments, at different times, are so contradictory and inconsistent, and they adhere so pertinaciously under every change of circumstances to the same dogmas, that it is impossible for me to confide implicitly in them.

In all the tariff discussions which I have heard heretofore, when the policy of unrestricted commerce has been established upon the great principles of political economy, and their harmony with the law of nature shown in the variety of climes, soils, and pursuits, the friends of protection have admitted the soundness of the theory, when practised upon by the leading nations of the earth. But they denied that this would ever be the case, and declared they were only opposed to that one-sided free trade by which restrictions were met with relaxations. Let the leading commercial nations, they have said, set the example of free trade, and we will follow it. We admit the advantages,

under such circumstances, which our genial climate, fertile soil, cheap land, comparative exemption from taxation, and free institutions, will give us; but until that is done, we must meet restrictions by restrictions. And in the case of Great Britain, we were asked, Will you admit her manufactures at a low duty, when, by her corn laws, she excludes our breadstuffs? If she will let us feed her manufacturers, we will purchase their fabrics; but if she will not do that, *by protection to our manufactures, we must build up a home market for our agriculturists.* They went further, and told us that Great Britain not only excluded our breadstuffs, when she had a tolerable supply at home, but that even in years of scarcity, when she was compelled to import, by the operation of her sliding scale, a decided advantage was given to continental Europe over us. Under her corn laws, as they stood a short time since, the admission of foreign corn and grain for home consumption took place under a sliding scale of duties, which fluctuated with the aggregate prices taken in one hundred and fifty market towns, situate in different parts of the country. When the price of wheat in those towns is 66 shillings, on an average of six weeks, the duty is 20s. 8d. per quarter, (of eight bushels;) and for every shilling which the price advances or falls, the duty advances or falls, as the case may be; so that, in the rising scale, when the price advances to 73 shillings, the duty falls to one shilling per quarter. Under the operation of this system, whenever at the end of any six weeks the price rose so high as to bring the duty down to the lowest point, and this fact was proclaimed by the Government, orders were despatched for foreign grain. Those sent to the ports in Europe were answered at once; importations flowed in, and before the expiration of another six weeks, the price of wheat would have fallen, and the duty risen. The orders sent to the United States could not be answered in six weeks; and when they were, the duty would have risen, and our exports excluded, or admitted at a higher duty than had been paid by the countries near at hand. In a word, protection to manufacturers was held out to the farmer as the alternative for the free trade which was denied them, and only as the alternative. It was in vain showed, that, taking our entire exports and imports to and from Great Britain, the average of duties which we imposed were more than twice as high as those which she imposed; it was in vain we showed, that more than half of our exports consisted in cotton, which was admitted into England at a nominal duty, and that by the encouragement thus given to its cultivation, a large tract of fertile land was withdrawn from the production of corn, from competition with the farming portions of the country, and even a market afforded for the horses, mules, pork, and breadstuffs of the latter. The advantages were indirect, and not very palpable, and the force of the argument was denied. It was in vain we referred to the fact, that, in spite of the obstacles, we exported a large amount of breadstuffs and provision to England; and that by exporting them through Canada, the British duties were evaded, and thus a compensating advantage afforded us for the disadvantageous operation upon us of the

sliding scale. It was in vain we exposed the utter folly of expecting to find consumers of the products of our teeming fields in the manufactories which the protective policy would raise up. Above all, it was in vain we demonstrated, by the principles of political economy, that it only aggravated the injurious effects upon us, of the restrictions of other nations, to meet them with restrictions upon our part; and that it was the course of vengeance rather than wisdom. The arguments were adhered to; and I must admit they produced their effect. They appealed to the natural disposition to retaliate injuries; to the spirit and pride of our people; and, I repeat, they had their effect.

But Great Britain no sooner changes her policy; she no sooner does the very thing which it had been admitted would make it expedient to unfetter commerce; she no sooner removes even the nominal duty from our cotton, reduces the duty upon all the produce of the farmer, and proposes to remove the duty entirely from our Indian corn—the great grain crop of the country; from our bacon, beef, both salted and fresh pork, and other meats; from our buckwheat—an item of importance; from hay, another one of importance; levies only a nominal duty upon our rice; abolishes her sliding scale, and admits wheat at a low fixed duty, till January, 1849, and thereafter free; in a word, she no sooner sets the example of abolishing commercial restrictions—the relics of a dark and feudal age—and admits three-fourths of the articles of our domestic exports comparatively free of duty, than these gentlemen turn round, recall all their own admissions, recant all their former arguments, and attempt to palm off upon us others utterly inconsistent with them! It remains to be seen whether such of the people as have been beguiled into the support of the protective policy by the arguments I have referred to, will adhere to it now after they have been abandoned.

The foundation of the fallacies to which I have referred, being demolished, it has been found necessary to lay the groundwork of new ones. And the speech of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. HUDSON] is a very vigorous beginning. He does not see the advantages to us of the relaxation, or the repeal of the corn laws by Great Britain; says that, by the repeal of them, we will lose the advantages of the indirect trade; that the wants of England will be supplied from the Continent, and by the extension and improvement of her own agriculture; that the demand there for our breadstuffs and provisions will be very inconsiderable; and that the best reliance of our farmers is in a high tariff, by which a home market will be built up! This is the grand *finale* of all their arguments. The panacea for all the ills the State is heir to!

I desire to examine all these propositions, and some others connected with them.

1. As to the advantages of the indirect trade through Canada, of which the repeal of the English corn-laws will deprive us. I admit it was of much advantage to the American farmer, and went far to compensate him for the injurious operation of the sliding scale. But there are many circumstances which made that trade far less advantageous than at first sight would appear. The route through

the lakes, and the canals which connect them and the St. Lawrence, to the ocean, is long and circuitous; much more so than the one through the States. It closes early in the winter, and does not open, in its full extent, until late in the spring, upon the approach of warm weather, which is unpropitious to the shipment of breadstuffs and meat. The exports from Canada are chiefly of heavy articles, mostly breadstuffs and timber. The imports in bulk are comparatively small, consisting only of supplies for themselves, and such small articles as they can smuggle into the United States. Consequently, nearly the whole freight is on the outward voyage. Thus the advantages of the indirect trade are not very great. This is shown by the fact, that direct exportations take place to a considerable extent. Besides, when the export takes place through Canada, it is carried exclusively in English bottoms, and our navigation loses the advantage of carrying to market our own produce. I admit that the indirect trade through Canada has been of much advantage to the farmer, and compensated to some extent for the injurious effects upon us of the sliding scale. But I deny that the advantage, even to him, is anything like as great as a free trade in corn, to say nothing about the advantages which the latter confers upon our navigation. So the farmers need not be frightened at this part of the gentleman's exposition.

2. As to the assertion, that England will be amply supplied with breadstuffs from the continent of Europe, without drawing much of them from us, and at cheaper rates than we can afford: To sustain this position, the gentleman quotes largely from the return of the British consuls made to their Government in 1840. The history of those returns is this: In the discussions which were taking place at that time in England relative to the repeal of the corn-laws, the apprehension was not so much that the English market would be overflowed with continental wheat; but that if the stimulant of protection was withdrawn, production would be less at home, and Great Britain could not safely rely upon an adequate foreign supply. It was argued that the only effectual security against scarcity, was the stimulant of protection to home agriculture. To possess itself of full information on this point, the Government directed its consuls, in all of the great grain marts of the continent, to answer the following questions:

1st. What quantity of grain of each kind could be exported to England from the country or district in which you reside, if the trade in corn in England was made constantly open at a moderate duty?

2d. What would probably be the average price free on board?

3d. What would probably be the freight per quarter to England?

4th. Would the exportation be subject to any other charges?

5th. Whether, if there was a regular and steady demand in England for foreign corn, the quantity of corn produced in the said country or district would, without much difficulty, and in a short space of time, be materially increased?

The reply to these questions are contained in the large quarto volume which I hold in my hand. I

have examined them with care. As to the quantities which could be supplied, the following is the summary printed in the gentleman's speech:

	Bushels.		Bushels.
St. Petersburg	1,540,000	Stettin	2,000,000
Liebau	240,000	Memel	47,712
Warsaw	2,400,000	Hamburg	4,304,000
Odessa	1,200,000	Elsinore	1,400,000
Stockholm	8,000	Palermo	1,600,000
Dantzig	2,520,000		
Konigsberg	520,000		
			17,779,712

The aggregate which could be supplied from the continent is thus put down at 17,779,712 bushels. But let us examine the data upon which this statement is made, and we will find, I think, that it is greatly exaggerated. Let us take up the places thus given, one by one. In all the estimates, for simplicity and ease, I only take wheat. But there are also large importations of rye, barley, oats, beans, &c., imported from the countries in question; but the same reasoning applied to wheat will apply to them.

1st. *St. Petersburg.* The consul says: "The district of St. Petersburg does not produce grain sufficient for its own consumption, and the deficiency is supplied from the inland provinces." From this and other portions of his answer, it is evident the consul, in his return for St. Petersburg, includes a large district of country, portions of which, in all probability, are included in the range of other consuls' returns. He puts down the quantity which could be exported to *all foreign countries*, not to England alone, at from 175,000 to 210,000 imperial quarters, of eight bushels each. In the table the mean of 192,500 quarters, or 1,540,000 bushels, is given. This quantity is purely conjectural, and is evidently too high. The consul gives the *actual* exports from 1830 to 1839, and they are for whole time 675,400 quarters—yearly average 75,080, or 600,640 bushels.

The entire quantity imported into England from the whole of Russia in 1840, which was a year of scarcity in England, when upwards of nineteen millions of bushels were imported, was 2,146,104; and, in 1841, when upwards of twenty-one millions were imported into England, only 796,792 came from Russia. For the three years ending 1843, the average import into England from the *whole* of Russia was 864,087 bushels. It is therefore evident that the amount put down to St. Petersburg alone is much too high. I think the committee will agree with me that one million of bushels is a high estimate. It is 400,000 more than the average exportation from 1830 to 1839.

2d. *Liebau.* The consul says: "Should the weather continue favorable during the harvest time, the quantities gathered for export from Liebau and Vindau, may come to the following extent, say 30,000 quarters"—or 240,000 bushels, the quantity given in the table. As to the quantity of this grain which could be exported to England, the consul says depends upon the demand and the price: "The greatest part of our former supplies were shipped off to Holland and to the interior of Russia." Again, he says: "About thirty thousand quarters of rye have been bought, which, after being ground into meal, is to be shipped to St. Petersburg." From this it is probable that the exports from Liebau are included in those

of St. Petersburg and Holland. However, as I desire to make an estimate above all cavil, I will leave the amount as stated in the table.

3d. *Warsaw*. It is evident, from the letters of the consuls, that the same wheat is included in the returns from Dantzig and Warsaw.

Dantzig is at the mouth of, and is the shipping port of the Vistula, upon which, in the interior, Warsaw is situated, and which is not navigable except in flat-boats. In answer to the second question, the consul at Warsaw says: "The expense of water carriage to Dantzig, Prussian transit duty, and charges on shipment, may be taken at 12s. per quarter." The consul at Dantzig says: "The chief export of grain from this port is the produce of Poland." He puts the export at 315,000 quarters. He forms his estimate upon the three years preceding, during which he says "the demand for England has been considerable." "It is to be considered the stock of corn in this country and in Poland had been accumulating three or four years previous to 1838, when the low averages in Britain were so discouraging for shipments; there is, therefore, a greater chance of less than a larger average quantity being shipped." The consul at Warsaw estimates the exports from that place at 300,000 quarters. Warsaw is not a shipping port. The wheat from its vicinity is carried to Dantzig in flat-boats of rude construction, by which alone is the Vistula navigated. For these reasons I take the estimate for one place only, and I take Dantzig, which is the highest, and, as will be inferred from the language of the consul, already quoted, probably too high.

4th. *Odessa*. I take the consul's estimate, as I see no reason for discarding it. This gives to the Russian ports a stock of 2,440,000 bushels for export to England. That even this estimate is very high is shown by the fact that the average yearly import into England from Russia, for the three years ending 1843, was only 864,087 bushels. And for the three preceding years, which were years of high prices, and a very large demand in England, the annual average was 1,816,794. Average for six years 1,340,440. And this average is larger than it had been for the preceding sixteen years. The quantity given in the corrected table is upwards of a million of bushels more, and is evidently very high.

5th. *Stockholm*. The estimate of the consul for this port is 1,000 quarters. He says: "From the best information, I find that the crops in Sweden vary in quantity and quality more than in any other European country; but taking six years, it appears that there are two abundant, three ordinary, and one insufficient harvest." The export of produce, he says, is "sent chiefly to Norway, but the quantity of wheat has always been inconsiderable." The average export from Sweden, for six years, given by him, ending with 1837, was 317 quarters, and during no one of the years was it as high as the consul estimates—the highest being 800 quarters. Still, as it is a small amount, and for the reasons given in the case of Liebau, I will not disturb the consul's estimate.

6th. *Dantzig*. Here I take the consul's estimate, which, for the reasons already given, is very high. The average exports from 1834 to 1840 was 276,279

quarters, which is 210,000 bushels less than the quantity given in my table.

7th. *Konigsburg*. This port is on the Vistula, near its mouth. It draws its supplies from the same region which Dantzig does. The probability is, that the two consuls have included the same data in their estimate. Still, I do not depart from it, as I have not and shall not do in any case, except for the plainest reason.

8th. *Stettin*. The consul says: "As the crop of all kinds of grain is considered this year to be very favorable in quantity and quality in this part of Prussia, and also in Silesia, the exportation to Great Britain may, if a moderate duty admits of it, amount to 250,000 quarters." This is the quantity given, and of course a high one.

9th. *Memel*. The consul says: "The quantity of grain shipped from here last year, (1839,) when the duty averaged very low, was, of wheat, 5,954 quarters, and it cannot, *under the most favorable circumstances*, be expected to exceed that of 1839, as the demand for grain of all descriptions was general throughout even in Russia." The quantity given is evidently too high for an average.

10th. *Elsinore*. The consul puts it at 175,000 quarters. This is evidently much too high. The average export from Denmark to all places, for twenty years ending 1839, was 106,736. The average import into Great Britain was much less. Much of her exports go to Norway, and her own West India Islands. The consul calculates upon a large increase, if the ports of England were open, as he thinks that thereby land would be converted from pasture to tillage. But it must be borne in mind that the proposed English tariff admits animals free of duty. So, in the countries in the vicinity, stock-raising will rather increase than diminish. It is not safe to put down Denmark at more than the average export for twenty years. I therefore take that sum.

11th. *Hamburg*. The estimate for this place appears to me to be very extravagant. The quantities are taken "on the average of years in which the largest export has taken place *under the most favorable circumstances*." "How much thereof," the consul says, "can be appropriated to England, will depend upon what may be wanted for Holland, France, Spain, Portugal, and other countries, which are as much or more dependent on supplies from Germany, than England is." Besides, it is known that the grain which is exported from Hamburg is not the growth of the surrounding country. In years of plenty, large quantities are purchased in the ports of Russia, Prussia, &c., already referred to, and stored, to be run into England whenever the operation of the sliding scale would enable them to do so to an advantage. The climate is such that grain can be kept for several years; and the speculation in the manner I have mentioned, has been very profitable to the Hamburg merchants. The consul says: "The merchants at Lubeck, as well as at Rotterdam, Bremen, and Hamburg, are desirous the corn-laws of England shall remain unaltered." "If she should adopt a fixed duty at a low rate, they are afraid of the competition of Odessa and America." Much of the corn included in this estimate is doubtless included in those already mentioned. Besides, it includes the entire amount

which can be exported to all countries, and not such only as can be exported to England. The average annual import into England from the whole of Germany for the three years ending 1843, was 2,449,690 bushels. For the reasons given, the quantity available for export to England from Germany ought not to be put even so high as that; but I adopt that amount.

12th. *Palermo.* The consul says: "About 200,000 quarters of *hard* wheat might be exported in abundant harvests. *In average harvests little or none.* The present production barely serves for the consumption of the present population. Sicily ceased to be a corn-exporting country in 1826." "The hard wheat is too hard to be ground by English mill-stones, and the soft—principally used for making maccaroni—will not keep in granaries, or bear transportation." The country is in a miserable condition, and the people exceedingly oppressed. It is idle, therefore, to expect exports from it. The table, as I have corrected it, stands thus:

	Bushels.	Bushels.
RUSSIAN PORTS.		
St. Petersburg.....	1,000,000	
Liebau	240,000	
Warsaw.....		
Odessa	1,200,000	
		2,440,000
SWEDEN.		
Stockholm.....		8,000
PRUSSIA.		
Dantzig.....	2,520,000	
Konigsburg.....	520,000	
Stettin.....	2,000,000	
Memel	47,712	
		5,087,712
DENMARK.		
Elsinore		853,888
GERMANY.		
Hamburg		2,449,690
		9,829,290
Total.....		9,829,290

This sum exceeds by 339,772 bushels, as the table hereafter presented shows, the average yearly import into England, for fifteen years, from all countries; and deducting the imports from the United States, which for the same time have averaged 944,536 bushels, and it leaves the entire average import from Europe 8,544,982 bushels; which is 1,284,308 bushels less than my estimate. But the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. H.] complains that in the estimate of the consuls, Riga, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and several other important ports for the corn trade, are not included. The reasons given for not including them are conclusive.

1st. As to Riga: The consul does not anticipate any supply from this port, for reasons which will be adverted to presently. Besides, the supplies of the port of Riga are drawn from Courland, Lithuania, and White Russia, from which Liebau also draws her supplies, an estimate for which is given. In addition to this, it has been shown that a larger supply is credited to Russia than she will probably afford. The consuls state that the greater part of the supplies both of Riga and Liebau are shipped to Holland.

2d. As to Rotterdam: The consul states that her exports are the produce of northern Europe, warehoused in Holland. The export of those countries has already been estimated. The consul states that the wheat grown in Holland "is not of a quality adapted to the English market."

3d. As to Antwerp: The consul says what we all know, that Belgium raises no grain for export. He says: "The exportation of wheat and rye is at present (August, 1840,) prohibited; and with an augmenting population, the quantity of land cultivated in flax, beet-root, and chickory, which is increasing, has so diminished the growth of corn, that there is a deficiency of produce." The prohibition of the export of grain from Belgium still continues. As to "the other places" spoken of, it is impossible to say anything of them until they are named. It is believed that the whole circuit of the corn-trade in Europe is included in the table presented, if indeed the same countries are not sometimes included more than once.

The estimate, even in the table I present, in my opinion, is too high, made so by my too liberal concessions. But at all events it is not too low. This may be tested by a criterion which is pretty conclusive. The three harvests preceding the last, both in England and on the continent, have been very favorable: in England, so much so, that their imports of breadstuffs have been comparatively light. The climate is such in the north of Europe, and the grain there grown is of a kind which, in their climate will bear storage for several years. When, therefore, the seasons are favorable and the demand small, the merchants are in the habit of storing it to a very large extent, very often to the amount of many millions of quarters. The official returns of imports into England, in our library, do not come down later than 1842. But in a paper said to be written by the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. HUDSON,] they are stated for 1843 and 1844. I find statements of statistics in mere party productions so constantly inaccurate that I always use them with distrust. But in this instance I find them to correspond very nearly with those made last June by Sir James Graham, the Home Secretary, in the debate upon the repeal of the corn laws, and I presume they may be relied on. In 1843, the imports were 7,153,232 bushels. In 1844, they were 6,586,158. In 1845, they are supposed to have been somewhat larger. If, therefore, the surplus produced in Europe exceeded these amounts to any considerable extent, there would have been a large accumulation in the grain marts. But so far from this being the case, when the late unfavorable harvest happened, the statements were universal that the stock on hand in England and upon the continent was never known to be so light; so much so, that several of the Governments have prohibited exports of grain. As another proof that the surplus did not exceed the export to England, I may refer to the fact, that, during that time, the average price of wheat on the continent, without freight and charges to England, was 45s. per quarter, or, allowing for exchange, about \$1 42 $\frac{1}{2}$ per bushel. This price, which is higher than the general average, is inconsistent with the idea of an accumulated surplus. I think, therefore, that I am safe in saying that the surplus on the continent, in a series of years, will not exceed from six to eight millions of bushels, unless there is a largely-increased production there. Is this probable? Here, again, I shall resort freely to the information furnished in the returns of the British consuls.

1st, as to Russia. The consuls state that an increased supply is not to be looked for; and the reasons given for the opinions are conclusive. The one from St. Petersburg writes that—

"The district of St. Petersburg does not produce grain sufficient for its own consumption, and the deficiency is supplied from the inland Provinces."

The one from Riga says:

"The rapid increase of manufactures in this country has withdrawn many hands from tillage, which, in a thinly populated country like Russia, must operate against any increase of agriculture. In fact, it is considered by many to have contributed to the deficient production of corn in this country for some years past, although this deficiency may be principally attributed to the seasons. Flax is being yearly more and more cultivated in Russia, and especially in this Province, and the neighboring ones of Esthonia, Courland, Lithuania, and in White Russia, being an article that always finds a ready sale in the Riga market at remunerating prices; which also tends to counteract any great increase in the production of corn: to which may also be added the yearly extending establishments of beet-root sugar refineries, and cultivation of beet root, more particularly in the internal Provinces of the empire."

But the most conclusive reason is given by the consul at Odessa:

"There would be no material increase, and certainly not in a short space of time: 1st, Because in Podolia and Kiev, whence Odessa derives its principal supplies, the greatest quantity possible of grain is at all times produced without regard to price and demand, in consequence of capital being invested in slave labor, which is not otherwise to be employed. 2d. Because the plains called steppes, adjacent to the Black sea and Azoph, are thinly populated; so that in years when the crops are abundant, they are seen suffering on the ground for want of reapers. 3d. Because on these steppes crops are exceedingly precarious by reason of drought, the common calamity of this climate; of the high winds, which carry off the seed from this dusty soil; of the early thaws and subsequent frosts, without snow. 4th. Because tillage is defective and improvement difficult, under the present circumstances of the country. 5th. Because distances are great, and communications unaided by art, there being no roads, and the rivers being unnavigable. 6th. Because the landholders are impoverished, and most of them indebted to the crown, and the working classes are degraded by their condition of slavery. 7th. Because no progressive improvements are to be expected in Russia, until great organic changes are brought about, or so long as the real interests of the country are sacrificed to an anti-commercial policy. Very high prices may indeed cause at times a greater exportation, not by increase of production, but by extending the circle of supply."

All the authentic accounts of Russia and Poland, which are included together, agree with those I present. As to the mode and difficulty of navigating the rivers, I present the following account of the trade of Dantzig:

"The largest supplies of grain imported into Great Britain have generally come from Dantzig. The grain is chiefly brought from the interior on the river Vistula, Bug, &c., in flatboats of the rudest construction, open to the effects of the weather and the hand of the pilferer. During the passage, which lasts several weeks, and even months, the sprouting of the wheat on the top forms a thick mat, and that constitutes a tolerable covering for the bulk. The boats carry from 180 to 200 quarters (1,440 to 1,600 bushels) of wheat; are navigated by six or seven men, with a small boat to sound ahead, to find the shifting shoals; are broken up and the materials sold at Dantzig. The wheat (all but the grown surface) is thrown out upon the fields and dried, and then stored in warehouses, the whole of which are capable of holding 500,000 quarters, (4,000,000 bushels.) The average cost of the inland freight, including waste, is 8s. 6d. per quarter, equal to 25 cents per bushel. The expense of drying, cleaning, and warehousing, at Dantzig, is 2s. more, or six cents per bushel."

This is the manner in which the trade is carried on in one great grain mart; let us see how it is in the other. Mr. Platt, in his history of the corn laws, says:

"The corn-growing countries in the southeast of Europe, and in the countries bordering the Black sea export their produce by the Don, the Dnieper, the Dniester, and the Danube, or by land-carriage to Odessa, for shipment to foreign countries; and that port stands in the same relation to the south of Europe as Dantzig does to the northern part. The principal supply, however, is brought to the town in carts, drawn by oxen, from distances varying from one to four hundred miles. The voyage to England is long, and there is great risk of the grain heating, and the expense of importing amounts to 15s. or 16s., or even 20s. the quarter, or 60 cents the bushel. Mr. Jacobs's account of the manner in which corn is transported to Odessa, shows the physical impossibility of this competition becoming a matter of anxiety to the most timid agriculturist."

Each of these carts are drawn by two oxen; and Mr. Plate says:

"Two oxen cannot travel over such rugged hills and deep sands as are found between the corn-growing districts and Odessa at a greater rate than ten miles per day. Each hundred miles will thus require ten days work for two oxen and one man." "In the journey of near 100 miles across the steppes, in the months in which the greater number of carriages pass over them, the vegetation is wholly burnt up, which, with the scarcity of water, must cause much expense in the maintenance of the cattle."

These are the two great grain marts with which the gentleman thinks we cannot compete.

2d. As to Prussia. Agriculture in Prussia is in such an advanced state, the population is increasing so rapidly, and the farmers find the breeding of horses, cattle, and sheep, so profitable, that an increased supply of corn is not to be looked for from this kingdom. And here permit me to remark, once for all, that the proposed change of the British tariff, which admits live animals, and meat, both salt and fresh, free of duty, is calculated to increase, rather than diminish, grazing in the countries near England. In grain and salted meat, they will have competitors in distant lands; but in live stock and fresh meat, they will have the English market to themselves. The consul from Konigsburg says:

"The farmers find it more profitable to devote their attention to the breeding of sheep, horses, and cattle, which answer better than growing corn."

From Dantzig:

"The districts of Prussia, adjoining Dantzig, are in such an advanced state of cultivation, that a larger supply for shipment could not be expected."

From Stettin:

"The production of all kind of grain has, these two or three years, been extended to a considerable degree; it is therefore not to be expected the landholders can much augment the same, the cultivation of additional soil not being in their system of agriculture, particularly as the production of oil seed, of potatoes for spirit, and pasture and food for sheep and cattle, has been too advantageous for them to curtail the same to any considerable degree."

As to Germany, the consul from Hamburg says:

"An increased quantity of grain is not to be looked for, because as much land is already appropriated in this district to the growth of corn, as the system of husbandry established in these duchies will admit of; wool, butter, and potatoes for distillation, having for many years been profitable produce to the farmer, he will not easily be induced to give up the cultivation of the latter, or to sell off his sheep and cattle, which, moreover, afford manure positively necessary for the cultivation of grain."

In conclusion upon this head, I may refer to the calculation under the preceding one, to show that diminished, rather than increased supplies, are to be looked for from the continent. Sir James Graham, in the House of Commons, in June last, repeating the statements of Mr. Villiers upon this subject, stated:

"The honorable member for Wolverhampton has condemned the system of past protection; but with reference to the future, the facts he discloses are not to be overlooked. He tells us that France is rapidly becoming a more and more importing country; that Belgium has followed our example, and protects her corn. If I mistake not, Bavaria, and several of the Rhenish provinces, have placed an export duty upon their corn, progressively increasing as the price of corn rises. It was stated by the honorable member for Wolverhampton himself, that in consequence of the transition which has taken place in many of the corn-growing districts of Europe from the condition of purely agricultural to that of mixed manufacturing countries, the consumption of corn is increasing, while the means of exporting are proportionally diminishing. The honorable member shows you that your means of obtaining a supply of corn from Europe are gradually, but progressively decreasing."

Let us next inquire what quantity of foreign grain Great Britain will probably require for her consumption. She exported grain until about the close of the last century; but from 1793 to this time, with the single exception of 1808, her imports have greatly exceeded her exports of grain, and the excess has been progressively increasing. From 1828 to 1842, (the last year for which we have official returns,) fifteen years, the average annual excess of imports over exports has been 14,130,096 bushels. And for the last five years, viz: from 1838 to 1842, the average annual excess of imports over exports was 21,112,824 bushels. This includes the trade with Ireland.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Hudson] presents the following table, containing the importations, not including Ireland, from 1829 to 1843. This table makes the average 10,964,896 bushels, including the years 1833, 1834, 1835, and 1836, during which the harvests in England were abundant beyond all precedent, and when the importations were very small. The colonial exports were principally from Canada, and the produce of this country, as is apparent from the fact, for a series of years our exports of flour and grain to Canada have been larger than her exports of the same articles to England.

Amount of wheat and wheat flour, in bushels, imported into Great Britain for home consumption from 1829 to 1843, inclusive, distinguishing foreign from colonial.

YEAR.	Foreign.	Colonial.	Total.
	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.
1829	11,504,768	68,840	11,572,608
1830	13,338,304	484,472	13,822,776
1831	10,952,352	1,101,568	12,052,920
1832	1,510,160	1,551,880	3,062,040
1833	10,560	661,648	672,208
1834	2,320	517,472	519,792
1835	950	227,440	228,400
1836	8,360	232,496	240,856
1837	1,686,176	293,000	1,979,176
1838	14,550,624	237,176	14,787,800
1839	21,592,848	101,936	21,693,784
1840	18,291,096	910,392	19,201,488
1841	19,105,264	2,076,808	21,182,072
1842	22,202,512	1,714,648	23,917,160
1843	7,586,472	1,953,912	9,540,384
Average	9,489,518	703,911	10,954,896

The gentleman admits that England in future will require in an average of years about 14,000,000 of bushels. I think the amount will be much larger. The average for the last six years presented

in the table is 19,104,977; and in future I think the quantity which it will require will be larger, rather than less.*

In the first place, an increased supply will be requisite to meet the demands of her increasing population. Both Mr. Western and Dr. Colquhoun—whose calculation Mr. McCulloch adopts in his Commercial Dictionary—estimates the consumption of Great Britain in 1812 and 1814, with a population of 16,000,000, at 35,000,000 of quarters, or a fraction over 17 bushels per head. This estimate includes the entire amount consumed by man and beast, used in beer and spirits, and in various manufactures. The English population is increasing at the rate of about 400,000 annually. At the rate estimated by these gentlemen, this increase of population alone would cause an increased consumption of 6,800,000 bushels of grain.

In the second place, by the repeal of the corn-laws the price of bread and meat will be less, and the consumption will be greatly increased. A very large portion of the English consumers are laborers, whose wages are scarcely sufficient for their support, and are divided in supplying their wants, between a house, fuel, raiment, &c., and only a portion is appropriated to food, and very rarely enough to procure an ample supply. When food is cheaper, more can be purchased with the same money, and consumption will be increased. This has invariably been found to be the case in England, particularly in articles of food. This was lately strikingly exemplified in the case of sugar, where, in consequence of the reduction of the duty, the price was lowered, whereby the consumption was greatly increased; so much so that, notwithstanding the great reduction of duty, the revenue derived was very little diminished. Many other instances of the same sort are given in the very able pamphlet of W. E. Gladstone, (a member of the British Cabinet,) upon the effect of the late commercial legislation in England, and also in the debates in the British Parliament.

But, says the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Hudson,] "if the price of wheat is reduced in Great Britain, as her dependence is mainly upon her own crops, it will tend to reduce the price of labor, and hence diminish the ability of the laboring classes to purchase. This may operate to the full amount of the reduction, and so prevent any increased consumption."

This is no new idea of the gentleman's; it was propagated and exploded many years ago. The idea that wages invariably rise and fall with the price of food, was inculcated by Norfolk squires, as long ago as 1795. But Burke, the most philosophical of statesmen, exposed its fallacy in his "Thoughts and Details on Scarcity." "Nay," said Burke, "it is not so. I allow it" (the rate of wages) "has not fluctuated with that price," (of provisions,) "nor ought it; and the squires of Norfolk had dined when they gave it as their opinion that it might, or ought, to rise and fall with the market of provisions. The rate of wages, in truth, has no direct relation to that price. Labor is a commodity like every other, and rises and falls according to the demand."

* Sir G. Clerk, as will be seen in a subsequent note, estimates the quantity at 24,000,000 of bushels.

I believe (said Mr. B.) that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. HUDSON] does *not dine* in the sense in which Burke said the Norfolk squires had.

Mr. GENTRY. He is a teetotaller.

Mr. BAILY. I am aware of that, but then he comes into this House and attempts to pass off upon us opinions which Burke could only account for when propounded by Norfolk squires, upon the supposition that they were anything but teetotallers.

So far from cheap provisions causing low wages, the tendency is the very reverse. The rate of wages is regulated by the supply and the demand for labor. When the prices of provisions are low, the community can expend more in the purchase of other articles, an increased demand for which is created, and consequently for the labor to produce them; and with that increased demand, an enhancement of the rate of wages. Upon this subject, in the debate in Parliament, on the 22d of January last, Sir Robert Peel said:

"First, as to wages. Who can deny the fact, that, during the three years that preceded the month of October last, prices were comparatively low? There was comparative cheapness and plenty, and yet at no period were the wages of labor higher than during that period. If you take the three preceding years you will find high prices, and co-existent with high prices you will find low wages. Well, then, I have six years—I have during the first three years high prices and low wages; I have during the last three years low prices and high wages; and I cannot resist the conclusion that wages do not vary with the price of provisions. They *do* vary with the increase of capital, with the prosperity of the country, with the increased power to employ labor; but there is no immediate relation between wages and provisions; or if there be a relation, it is in an inverse ratio."

Tooke, in his History of Prices, produces many facts and arguments to establish this proposition; but it is clear enough without quoting them. But, says the gentleman from Massachusetts:

"Every man acquainted with English agriculture knows that great improvements are constantly taking place in her mode of cultivation. Bogs and swamps are being reclaimed, barren hill-sides are being converted into fruitful fields, and her waste places are being made to blossom like the rose.

"Under these circumstances, it is not probable that her demand for foreign grain will materially increase. Her own supply will increase with her demand."

Now, sir, I have seen this proposition often advanced before, and I desire to examine it. We all know that England, from its first settlement, has been an agricultural country. From that time agricultural pursuits have been considered most honorable, and, as a consequence, have been most sought. For a long time the accumulation of capital, and the want of secure investment for it, has been very great. Land has always been regarded there as the most desirable of investments. The possession of land conferred consideration. It is considered a necessary qualification to public employment and admission into the House of Lords. For a long time the pressure of an increasing population has been very great, and the supply of labor has outrun the demand; so much so, that the constant call upon the parishes for the support of the poor has been very great; and, as a consequence, the possessors of the soil, upon whom the cost of supporting the poor mainly falls, have had not only the stimulant of humanity, but of pecuni-

ary interest, to find for that labor employment, which generally could be commanded for the support of the laborer. In addition to all this, the price of agricultural produce in Great Britain for the last fifty years has been very high. In August, 1795, wheat was 108s. 4d. per quarter—[a quarter is eight bushels, and a shilling is a little more than 24 cents.] The price fell, in consequence of abundant harvests, for the two succeeding years, but rose again in June, 1800, to 134s. 5d. the quarter; but in December fell to 133s. In March, 1801, it was 155s. The prices fluctuated with the seasons, but the average for the ten years from 1795 to 1805 was 81s. In the ten years ending 1815, the harvests had been unfavorable. In August, 1812, wheat was 155s. the quarter. Coincident with unfavorable seasons, there was, during this period, superadded the effects of the great wars in which England was engaged, which, by impeding commercial intercourse, cut off foreign supplies. Average price for ten years, 97s. 6d.

These high prices, and the stagnation of commercial and manufacturing enterprise during the war, stimulated cultivation; and from 1804 to 1814 the royal assent was given to 1,084 enclosure bills. A great deal of land, unsuited to cultivation, was put in grain—downs, only fit for sheep-walks, were converted into cornfields, which, after the conclusion of peace, were thrown out of cultivation again. And yet the prices at that time were by no means low. In the ten years ending 1825, the average price was 78s. 8d. per quarter; for the ten years ending 1835, it was 56s. 7d.; and for the ten years ending 1845, 57s. 11d., or a little more than \$1 75 per bushel. With these admitted facts staring us in the face, there are few who will doubt that cultivation has been extended nearly to its utmost limit, or believe that, after the repeal of the corn laws, cultivation will be much more extended.

The gentleman tells us about bogs to be reclaimed, and barren hill-sides to be converted into fruitful fields. I have heard all this often before, and I have seen a formidable array of the number of acres of land in Great Britain which are not cultivated. After the statements I have made, who will believe that there can be much land fit for cultivation unoccupied? The lands referred to are precipitate and rocky hill-sides, unfit for cultivation, or salt marshes, which are either irreclaimable, or not to be reclaimed except at too great cost; highways and commons dedicated to the public; or noblemen's and gentlemen's parks and pleasure-grounds.

As to the last, it is not to be expected that they will be curtailed. The Englishman looks upon his old baronial halls and ancestral oaks as sacred things, not to be touched by the ruthless hand of innovation. A fondness for these things is a national taste. And as the population and wealth of the kingdom increases, the probability is that a larger rather than a less extent of land will be occupied in this way. A man who has grown rich in commerce adds to his consequence by becoming a land proprietor, with his parks and grounds. These things are luxuries which are indulged in without reference to the loss thereby incurred; but they are not entirely profitless. The parks are grazed, and wood is got from them; and the

difference in mere profit is not so great as to hold out any great inducement to sacrifice taste.

As to the first, the fact that it has remained so long uncultivated, when there were such strong inducements to cultivation, shows that it cannot be cultivated with profit. What do we mean when we say land cannot be cultivated with profit? As long as land will yield more than will pay for the cultivation, it will yield a profit. In a country like England, where there is a superabundance of labor, it can always be commanded for a support. When, therefore, in such a country, you say land cannot be cultivated with profit, you only say that it will yield no more than a support to the laborers employed in its cultivation. You may extend the cultivation of such land indefinitely, and you do not add to the available surplus of provisions. You add to the employment of labor, but you do no more. Why, I have heard it said by persons well informed, that the two thousand of miles of railroads lately authorized in England will occupy, estimating quantity and quality, more land than now remains to be cultivated.

But the gentleman argues that the improvement in the cultivation of the land will keep pace with the increased demand for provisions; and he calculates upon the saving of five millions in an improved mode of seeding alone! I have no doubt that improvements in agriculture in England will continue to be made; but I have no idea they will keep pace with the increasing demands of a growing population. We have already seen that the imports of provisions have been progressively increasing for fifty years. England is already cultivated like a garden, and the average produce of wheat, including all the land in cultivation in the kingdom, and all the accidents and casualties, is 28 bushels per acre! On the good land it is a vast deal more. There is a point beyond which agricultural improvement cannot go; and the farmers of this country can judge whether, when the average product of the land, including good, bad, and indifferent, has reached twenty-eight bushels per acre, that point has not been nearly attained. Besides, we have seen that the population is increasing rapidly, and that that increase alone will require an increased supply of 6,800,000 bushels of grain annually. Population for the last fifty years has been constantly growing upon production, and in the future it will do so more rapidly. In an increase of population there is laid the foundation of still greater increase; population increase in a geometrical ratio, subsistence can only proceed in an arithmetical ratio. While population puts on its seven-league boots and advances at the rate of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64; or in other words, according to my friend from Indiana [Mr. KENNEDY's] multiplication table, no science or skill can add to the means of subsistence at a greater rate than the sober pace of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. So that population outstrips production more than nine to one. England, and still more this country, is a striking exemplification of this. In the former, notwithstanding improvements in agriculture, and additional lands have been brought into cultivation, the supply of the means of subsistence has not kept pace with the increased demands of an augmenting population;

and in this country, notwithstanding the virgin soil constantly brought into cultivation, the increased supplies have not outrun the increased demand. Considering the great extent of uncultivated land, this can only be accounted for in this country by the great encouragement which has been given to other pursuits of industry at the expense of agriculture. But in England the reverse is the case. In future, I insist that the supply in England will not keep pace with the demand. Whereas here, in consequence of the vast extent of either uncultivated or badly cultivated land, the reverse will, for many years, be the case, if the Government will only allow the agriculturist fair chance.*

We have thus seen that England is constantly requiring increased supplies of provisions, and that they are not to be looked for in adequate quantities, either from the continent, or in improvements or extension of her own agriculture. How will it be as to Ireland? Heretofore England has drawn large supplies from there. Are they likely to increase or fall off? Her population is constantly increasing, and for a number of years her exports to England have been falling off. Besides this, for the last few years, particularly the last year, potatoes—her great article of food, the exclusive article of food, it is said, of 4,000,000 of her people—has been subject to great destruction from disease. This has been attributed by those well informed on the subject, to over stimulant in the way of manure, applied to increase the product. To remove the cause of disease, you have to lessen the supply, and thereby increase the demand for other food. In addition to this, of late there has been a great addition to the culture of flax. This fact was stated, and acquiesced in in the debate in Parliament in June last.†

The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is, that hereafter smaller supplies will be drawn from that country. We have seen that the demand for provisions is constantly increasing; and before dismissing the subject, I have to remark, first, as to European competition with us in supplying it, that any increased production in England, Ireland, or on the

* As to the increased demand for provisions in England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the late debate in Parliament, received since this speech was delivered, said: "The addition made to the number of the population of this country every year, was such as would require from 100,000 to 200,000 acres to be taken into cultivation for wheat to meet the wants of the increased population. In such a state of things, you must be able to add almost *an additional county* under cultivation every year." In the same debate, Sir G. Clerk, the Vice President of the Board of Trade, said: "Within the last five years, there has been imported into this country ten millions of quarters of corn, or two millions annually. The experience of the last thirty years proved that the rate of population advanced more rapidly than the rate of production, and that this was true was attested by the fact that for a long series of years we had every year been compelled to increase our importations of foreign corn in proportion as we approached more closely to the present time; and bearing in mind this fact, the truth of which was not to be contested, he could not help thinking—no matter how vigorously, no matter how scientifically the arts of agriculture might be applied to the enrichment of the soil—for the next ten years we would be compelled to import 3,000,000 of quarters of corn annually instead of two.

† In the late debate in Parliament, already referred to, Sir Robert Peel said: "We see by the evidence of Lord Devon's committee, that flax is more profitable than wheat." "The cultivation of flax in Ireland has prospered." And he shows that it had extended.

continent, of grain, is the work of time, and, in the countries referred to, it is difficult. The commodity does not admit of rapid and certain multiplication, except perhaps in the United States. All attempts to produce grain, costs grain. Present quantity is sacrificed in many ways to future increase. The production of a million of bushels of wheat over the present supply, will cost as much labor and food as the building of a fortification, the cutting of a canal, the construction of a railroad, or any other extensive work. Nations which in other respects are poor, ineffective, and destitute of skill and enterprise, are so in the production of grain. All of us who are farmers know how farmers, above all other people, are wedded to the mode of cultivation to which we are accustomed. The son pursues the system of his father, and because it was his father's. They are distrustful of innovations, even under the most favorable circumstances. With what folly is it then that we look for improvements in countries where the cultivators of the soil are borne down with poverty, taxation, and oppression in every shape; their faculties benumbed by despotism; everything like enterprise discouraged nothing but ignorance and poverty in possession; nothing but ignorance and poverty in prospect.

2d. A great want in England and Ireland is a substitute for potatoes and a cheaper breadstuff than wheat. This is found in our Indian corn and buckwheat, which Sir R. Peel proposes to admit immediately free of duty.

3d. A desideratum in England is a good and cheap food for cattle. Stronger proof of this could not be adduced than a fact mentioned by the gentleman himself. He says: "Tooke, an experienced English writer, informs us that, from 1832 to 1838, the crops in Great Britain and Ireland were so abundant, that wheat was fed out to cattle, sheep, and swine, and even used for distillation." Now, during that time the average price of wheat, per London Gazette, was 52s. 5d. a quarter, or about \$1.60 per bushel. Rather dear food for cattle. Our Indian corn and hay supplies it. I have seen the idea referred to with some indignation, that our Indian corn should only be wanted as food for cattle. But for myself, as a producer of corn, I would rather they would use it in that way than any other, as it would likely lead to a greater demand for it. In reference to this subject, Sir Robert Peel, in his speech in January last, said:

"I have already adverted incidentally to that most valuable department of agriculture, the fattening of cattle. I believe it is impossible to over-estimate the importance of fattening cattle as instrumental in the improved system of agriculture. The increase of the fertility of the soil, by means of manure, is one of the most beautiful of the dispensations of Providence; and I believe there is no manure, let it come from where it will, that, with respect to its fertilizing power, can enter into competition with that derived from the cattle fed on the soil itself. You cannot conduce more to the improvement of inferior soils than by encouraging the feeding and fattening cattle, and promoting the application of their manure to increasing fertility. I propose, therefore, that an article of grain which I believe might be applied to the fattening of cattle shall hereafter be imported duty free. [Cheers.] It is an article of immense importance—maize, or Indian corn. [Cheers.] I propose that the duty upon it shall be hereafter and immediately nominal. [Hear.] I do not consider that, by the removal of the duty on maize, I am depriving agriculture of any protection. I understand that in the United States maize is used partly as human food, and

that in this country its utility as human food is too much disregarded. [Hear, hear.] In some parts of the continent it is held to make excellent food, and it might be advantageously applied in the same way in Great Britain. To promote the free import of maize seems to me so far from doing agriculture a disservice, it will be doing it a benefit, by promoting the nourishment and fattening of cattle. For nearly the same reasons, I suggest that buckwheat should be subjected to the same rule, namely, that the duty should be made merely nominal. I propose, likewise, that meal should be introduced upon the same terms as grain. [Hear, hear.] If any honorable gentleman can ascertain the enormous sums now paid by our best farmers in the purchase of linseed cake and rape cake, I think they will agree with me that to give increased facilities to the introduction of such articles will be doing no disservice to agriculture. The demand for this cake is so great, that the price is gradually rising, and the consumption on some farms is daily increasing: on some farms linseed and rape-cake chiefly provide the manure for the better cultivation of the soil. The following is a comparative statement of the price of linseed and rape-cake at various recent periods:

Price of linseed cakes per 1,000 in the month of—
 January, 1840..... £9 0 0 to £10 0 0
 " 1844..... 10 0 0 to 10 10 0
 " 1846..... 12 0 0 to 12 5 0

Price of rape-cake per ton—
 January, 1843..... 5 5 0
 " 1844..... 5 5 0 to 5 10 0
 Dec'r, 1844..... 4 5 0 to 4 10 0
 January, 1846..... 5 17 0 to 6 0 0

Now, in the supply of Indian corn, we can have no competitors. It is not raised in England or Ireland, or in the north of Europe at all.

And here, Mr. Chairman, permit me to digress, and remark, that the opening of the English ports to the free admission of Indian corn, is not only of the greatest consequence to the agriculture of Virginia, but to her merchants and towns. We have been talking for a long time about a direct trade with England, but our difficulty heretofore has been the want of sufficient exports to keep up a constant trade with her. We export but little cotton, and the demand in England for our Virginia tobacco was not sufficient to keep up a constant trade. But Norfolk is a great dépôt for corn. There are brought to that market from North Carolina and Virginia, several millions annually; it is thence shipped to the West Indies and the eastern States. But if our merchants in that city shall hereafter exhibit a proper enterprise, they will ship directly to England. Corn is cheaper in Norfolk than in the northern cities, and she will have the advantage, so far, of them in this trade. It was a similar state of things which heretofore gave her such a large share of the West India trade. But I will not pursue this subject, as my argument is designed mainly for the agriculturist.

4th. In estimating what we have to expect from European competition, there is a curious fact which I have to mention, one of many millions of others illustrative of the goodness of an all-wise Providence. From a long series of observations, it has been found that short crops in Europe are almost always co-existent with good crops here. In both hemispheres good and bad crops come in cycles, varying from three to seven years. And I repeat, that in a long series of years, good crops in this country have been co-existent with bad crops in Europe. This is not accidental, but it results from a provision of an all-wise Providence. It results from the fact that the corn regions of the two continents are in different latitudes. In this country the wheat region is between the 36th and 42d paral-

lel of north latitude; in Europe it is between 50° and 60° . So the circumstances which insure a good crop here are apt, nay, as observation shows, are sure to produce bad crops there. And here, permit me to observe, is another proof, amid thousands of others, that the free commerce and interchange of commodities is the law of nature. So sung Virgil, as long ago as the days of Octavius:

"This ground with Bacchus, that with Ceres suits:
That other loads the trees with happy fruits:
A fourth, with grass unbidden decks the ground.
Thus Tinolus is with yellow saffron crowned:
India black ebon and white ivory bears;
And soft Idume weeps her od'rous tears.
Thus Pontus sends her beaver-stones from far;
And naked Spaniards temper steel for war:
Epirus, for th' Elean chariot, breeds
(In hopes of palms) a race of running steeds.
This is th' original contract; these the laws
Imposed by Nature and by Nature's cause."

I quote from Dryden's beautiful translation.

It is not less in consonance with the wisdom than with the goodness of God. It modifies the sad and awful curse by which man was condemned to live by the sweat of his brow. Permit it, and the labors of nations are diminished, and their comforts increased. Does this truth require an illustration? If so, here it is. The Virginia farmer wants bread and he wants sugar. He can make both. Good sugar is made of beets, and he can raise them, but not to an advantage. The Cuba planter has the same wants, he wants bread and he wants sugar. He can raise both, although his climate and soil is not adapted to the production of the former. Let, then, the Virginian devote himself exclusively to the cultivation of grain, and the Cuba planter to sugar, and both will have more of each article than if he undertook to raise both for himself. Under this system, the Virginia farmer can get more sugar with the same labor by cultivating corn, and the Cuba planter can get more corn with the same labor by cultivating sugar. But man, by legislation, will impiously attempt to counteract the decrees of an all-wise and all-good God.

I have been led unintentionally into this digression. It is not in theories, but in statistics, I desire to deal.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Hudson] undertakes to underrate our trade with foreign countries in breadstuffs and provisions—particularly with Great Britain. He makes a calculation, based upon the commercial document, the census of 1840, and the estimates of the Commissioner of Patents since, to show that, of the 96,000,000 of bushels of wheat produced for the last five years, one-tenth has been retained for seed; 79,000,000 of bushels have been consumed in this country; and only 7,400,000 has been exported. In reference to Great Britain, he makes a statement, which, as I desire to refer to it by-and-by, I quote his own language from the pamphlet copy of his speech:

"In 1840 and 1841, we exported to Great Britain an average of 2,390,000 bushels a year; but in the two succeeding, viz: 1843 and 1844, we exported only an average of 464,800 bushels a year. But, sir, as I wish to do perfect justice to the subject, I readily admit that, by a change in our commercial year, the year 1843 consisted of only nine months; I wish, therefore to add to it another quarter, so as to make it of the usual length. But if we add one-fourth to the im-

ports of that year, so as to make up four quarters, or twelve months, we shall have even then an average for the two years of only 476,700 bushels a year."

A little further on he says:

"Our best, and in fact our principal trade with the mother country, in the article in question, has been through Canada. For the last seven years, we have sent into Canada 12,586,892 bushels of wheat, while our direct trade to England, at the same time, has amounted to only 7,764,588 bushels, being 62 per cent. more to Canada than to England. Or, if we take the last three years, we have sent into Canada 6,325,607 bushels, and into England 2,097,598 bushels, being more than three times as much into Canada as into England"

From all this he infers that our exports are very insignificant, as compared with the consumption of this country. As far as the number of bushels is concerned, the export is comparatively insignificant; but as far as its effects on prices are concerned, it is mighty. It is the price obtained for the excess exported, which fixes the price of the whole amount of produce. The farmer consumes more than half his own produce, but his own consumption has nothing to do with the price of it. That depends upon what he gets in the market for the surplus. The price of grain in Virginia depends upon the price in New York, and the price there depends upon the price in foreign countries. A thousand facts could be produced to establish this position; but a little reflection will satisfy any one of its truth. Whenever, in any country, there is a surplus of any commodity, whenever the supply exceeds the demand, competition takes place between the holders of it until the price is brought down to the lowest point. And so, on the other hand, when there is a deficiency of supply, competition takes place between the buyers, until the article is advanced to a very high price. And it does not require a large surplus or deficiency to produce this result. The rise or fall of price is by no means in the ratio of the excess or deficiency of supply. Very often a very small surplus will cause a very great fall, and so "*vice versa.*" A more striking illustration of this cannot be produced than the corn-trade of England itself affords. Mr. Platt, in his history of the corn-laws, says: "The average price of wheat for 1835, was under 40s. the quarter, and after 1839 it was 80 per cent. higher, or 70s. 8d.; yet no one will assert that the crops were nearly one-half below an average, or even one-fourth. The deficiency in 1839 is not estimated as more than a seventh, or, at the utmost, one-fifth, yet the prices rose to nearly double that amount." This was the effect of the increased demand in England. What was it on the continent? The same author says: "In 1838, after we had for several years nearly ceased resorting to the continental markets, we again became extensive purchasers. Before this necessity was fully apparent, the price of wheat at Dantzic was as low as 24s. 1d. the quarter, but in the course of the year prices advanced to 61s. 2d., being a rise of 154 per cent., occasioned by the demand in England. At Amsterdam the rise was 131 per cent."

The New York Price Current and our commercial document show the same result in this country, flowing from a decreased demand. In 1842 we exported 7,237,968 bushels of wheat to all the world. To Great Britain direct, and through the

Canadas, 3,668,544; and the price in New York was from \$1 25 to \$1 28. In 1843 we exported to all the world 4,519,055, being a falling off in the export of 2,718,913. To Great Britain, direct and indirect, our export was 1,316,522; being less by 2,352,022—nearly the entire falling off being in our export to England; and the price in New York was from ninety to ninety-five cents. The falling off in the export was a little more than two per cent. upon our entire crop, and the fall in price was forty per cent.

But it is unnecessary to elaborate this point. We all know with what anxiety, small as is our export to England, in comparison with our entire product of wheat, the farmers look out for the news of the character of the English harvest. It is fresh in the recollection of all of us how prices of agricultural produce advanced last autumn, as soon as it was ascertained that the English crops were short.

Having thus seen that the price of grain in this country will, to a very great extent, be regulated by the price in England, let us see what will be the probable price there under a system of free trade in corn. We have already seen that the average price of wheat in England for the ten years ending 1845—most of which period was one of good harvests—has been 57s. 11d. per quarter, or about \$1 75 per bushel.

We have also seen that the average price on the continent, for the last three years, when the demand in England has been comparatively light, was 45s. the quarter. All charges added would bring it about up to the average price in England for the last ten years. I have read all the debates in Parliament which have taken place on this subject in the last few years; and also most of the authentic and valuable publications. And no one whose opinion has any authority, or who gives any substantial reason for his belief, has supposed that the general average, under a free admission of grain, will be less than it has been for the last ten years; and in years of scarcity it is admitted it will be higher. Take the general average of \$1 75 per bushel, and let us inquire what will be the price in New York. I am informed upon good authority that the freight from New York to Liverpool is generally 14 cents per bushel, and that the exchange between this country and England, which is generally about 9 per cent., will cover other charges. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Hudson] estimates the freight at from 17 to 18 cents per bushel, and concedes the exchange to be 10 per cent. But to avoid all cavil, I will put down the freight and charges, in addition to the exchange, at 20 cents per bushel, which, with the exchange, would be 30 cents per bushel. That would leave the price on the seaboard at \$1 55 per bushel. The freight from Chicago to New York is 34 cents per bushel; from Detroit 28; from Buffalo 23. Indian corn is generally a little more than half the price of wheat, and oats a little more than half the price of corn. The New York price current of this morning quotes corn at 68 to 69 cents; wheat \$1 15; oats 40 cents. Now, sir, I can say, that as a farmer, I want no more prosperity than I can enjoy with \$1 55, or even with a steady price of \$1 25 for my wheat, half the price for my corn, and half the

price of that for my oats. And that, at least, I shall enjoy, and I believe more, if Congress will only give the agriculturist "a fair field, and no favor." This is all I ask from them. Surely, surely, as they compose the great mass of our population, I have a right to ask that.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Hudson] says that labor in the grain-growing countries of the continent of Europe is cheaper than with us; and he insists that they will be able to undersell us, not only in the English market, but even in our own, if the duty on wheat were repealed. He refers to the fact, that in 1837 we imported 2,389,102 bushels of wheat more than we exported; and he asks the independent yeomanry of the West if they

"Are willing to be brought into competition with the down-trodden Poles and serfs of Russia, and so be compelled to labor for fifteen or twenty cents per day? Would devotion to party, or the satisfaction of following out the delusive theory of free trade, reconcile them to a condition so degraded? If they possess the independent spirit of freemen—if they are Americans—they will spurn such an idea."

Can anything be more ridiculous than all this? I would not deign to answer it, if I had not found that as absurd fallacies have heretofore, to some extent, received credence.

1st. As to the import of wheat in 1837: that was owing to a variety of causes, which then, for the first time, and it is to be hoped for the last, co-existed. During the years 1834, 1835, and 1836, there were a succession of good harvests in Europe. In 1837 the summer in Europe everywhere was warm and genial, and the crop was uncommonly abundant. In August, 1837, wheat sold in Hamburg for from 22s. 4d. to 29s. 4d. the quarter. That was the era of paper expansion and wild enterprise in this country. The paper bubble was then at its extreme inflation, and reckless speculation had usurped the place of regular industry. Canals, railroads, *morus multicaulis*, every sort of humbug and scheme was started and projected in every part of the country, and one-half the industry of the nation was diverted from its regular channels. At the same time, our crops were short from bad seasons. These were the circumstances under which the import of wheat took place. It is not probable they will ever coexist again.

But the agricultural labor of America cannot compete with the pauper labor of Europe! The gentleman has found this slang so potent in the case of the manufacturers, he hopes, it seems, it may be equally so in the case of the farmers. Why cannot we compete with them? Are we less intelligent? Are we less ingenious? less vigorous? less enterprising? In what field of competition have we been unable to meet the world, or any portion of it, either in the pursuits of war or peace? Have we shrunk from competition with them in the battle-field or in the trackless paths of commerce? Our navigation, for instance, labors under a positive disadvantage in comparison with that of Europe. It is calculated that our tariff increases the cost of building, equipping, and sailing our shipping at least five dollars per ton. Yet, with this disadvantage, we compete with Europe in every quarter of the globe. Our commercial marine already nearly equals that of England, and it exceeds that of any other nation on the globe.

How is it with our agriculture? Notwithstanding the oppressions of the tariff, as I shall hereafter exhibit them, we already compete successfully with the world. We already supply the West India colonies of England and Spain almost exclusively, and those of other European States to a very large amount. We supply Brazil, and to a considerable extent, England herself. We not only can compete with Europe, but we do it. No interest in the country is afraid of the competition of foreign labor or asks protection against it, but the manufacturers; and the reasons assigned for it in their case are utterly fallacious, as was most clearly shown by the gentleman from New York, [Mr. COLLIN,] whose good sense entitles him to be heard oftener than he is in this hall. He took the case of the Gleengham factory, which was especially singled out by the Congress of 1842, as one showing the necessity of protection; and he proved that of their entire expenditures only twenty-four per cent. was for labor. In all the other items of expenditure—the cost of water-power and the site for the factory, the price of the raw material, the amount of taxes, the cost of living, &c., they had the advantage of the English manufacturer. Well, suppose they paid twice as much for their labor, that would only make a difference of twelve per cent., which, as I shall directly show, is less than the cost of importing without any duty. So if trade was absolutely free they would still have the advantage of their European competitor. And if you would give them a duty of twelve per cent. they would have the advantage of his European competitor, even if he did not pay a cent for labor! And yet it is pauper labor they fear!!

Now, sir, I am the representative, not only in my legislative but in my individual character, of both capital and labor. My constituents and myself cultivate our land with our labor. Some of them with their own hands, others by their slaves.

We are more interested in the profits of labor than of capital. You cannot impair the profits of labor without injuring us. In this respect the southern planter and the independent free farmer who cultivates by his own labor his own land, differs from nearly all other capitalists. There is no antagonism with them, between labor and capital; and this was the real philosophy of Mr. Jefferson's remark, that the Democracy of the North were the natural allies of the South. As the representative of labor, and the owner of it to no inconsiderable extent, all I ask is to be permitted to compete with the pauper labor of Europe.

[Several western members: "That is all we ask, too."]

That is all you need ask. I know your country well. I am personally deeply interested in it. In one sense I am a western farmer as well as an eastern one. The only difference is, I do not there, as at home, cultivate my land with my own labor. We have greatly the advantage of Europeans, and in a fair competition we must greatly outstrip them. Profits are divided between capital and labor. The more capital is entitled to, the less will labor get. For instance, the land my friend from Indiana before me cultivates, which is as rich and productive as land can be, did not cost him \$10 per acre.

Mr. KENNEDY. No; not five.

Mr. BAYLY. The same land in England would sell for five hundred. In England, giving capital three per cent. it would receive \$15 before labor could get a cent. Whereas here, giving capital six per cent., labor would receive all over 30 cents. But this is not our only advantage. Where is our comparative freedom from taxation, our genial climate, our natural advantages in our bays, rivers, not navigated by such miserable craft as we have seen are used in Prussia and Poland, but by magnificent steamboats? Where are our railroads and canals? And, above all, where are our glorious free institutions? [Applause.]

But, sir, we cannot reap the full benefit of these advantages until we have removed the incubus of our restrictive system. We cannot expect to export our agricultural produce to other countries, unless we will import what they have to sell. It is physically impossible for you to export, unless you import. Our exports are about one hundred millions annually. This export, if we import nothing, would drain Europe of its specie in one year; money would become scarce there, prices would fall very low, and our export of necessity cease. These are axioms in political economy which require no proof. It is equally true, that if you embarrass your imports, you lessen the quantity and value of your exports. The effect of the tariff of 1842 was to curtail both our exports and imports, and to knock down the price of our agricultural produce. Before I turn to the facts to prove this last position, I desire to explain the reason of it, and I can do this best by an illustration. Suppose a merchant of New York exports a hundred bushels of wheat to England, there sells it, and purchases with the proceeds a hundred yards of cloth. Suppose 50 cents will pay the cost of exportation and importation, and give the merchant a fair profit; and suppose the merchant can sell the cloth in this market for \$1 50: if there is no duty, do you not perceive he will be able to give the farmer \$1 a bushel for his wheat? But suppose the Government steps in and levies a duty of 25 cents. Gentlemen say this will not enhance the price of the cloth here—their theory is, that high duties make lower, not higher prices. Well, the cloth will still be sold here for \$1 50. The merchant must still have, to cover the costs of exporting and importing, 50 cents—the Government will claim 25, and there will be only 75 left for the wheat. And the trade cannot go on, if more is given. But gentlemen will say that this is the fallacious "forty-bale" theory. I know it is the "forty-bale" theory; and I believe it is to some extent fallacious. But you must admit it to be a fallacy that the duty does not raise the price of the imported article, to prove it to be so. Admit the truth of this latter fallacy, and I defy any one to answer the "forty-bale" theory. But suppose the duty to raise the price of the imported article to the full extent of the duty, let us then see how the farmer would stand. As before, 50 cents is the merchant's share, 25 the Government's, \$1 the farmer's, and the article sells for \$1 75. But the farmer is but little better off; he is a consumer of imported articles, as well as the producer of the articles of export; and although he does not lose on this supposition as a producer, he

does as a consumer. And as he fills both capacities, it is immaterial to him. In either event, he gets 25 cents worth less cloth for his wheat than before the imposition of the duty; and to the extent you increase or lower the duty, is he taxed more or less. It is often very difficult to tell to what extent the duty falls upon the producer of the export, or the consumer. It depends upon a variety of circumstances, which are constantly fluctuating; and to the agriculturist, as I have shown, the exact adjustment is a matter of no great consequence. To this view there is but one possible answer; and that is, that the effect of the duty is not to increase the price of the imported article in our market, but to lower the price of it abroad. If this were true, it would impoverish the foreigner; but I do not see what possible advantage, in a commercial point of view, it would be to us.

We would get the article here at the same price; the consumer would not be injured; nor would our manufacturer be benefited. But our foreign customer would be impoverished, and would be a worse customer for our exports. So, in that view, we would be injured. But is it true that the effect of the duty is to compel the foreigner to sell lower? In England, for a long time, the pressure of population has been so great, and the competition so active, that prices had reached the lowest limit before the enactment of our tariff. Besides, the proportion which we take of British goods—and we take more of them than of any other nation—in comparison with her consumption at home, and her exports to her colonies, and to other foreign nations than ourselves, is very inconsiderable; and it is not probable that, to gain access to our market, they would submit to a reduction on the great mass of her production. They would lose less by giving up our trade altogether. But it may be said that I have already proved that the price of the quantity exported, which is fixed by the price in the foreign market, fixes the price of the entire production. In the case of the agriculturist of this country that is so; but in the case in hand it is not so. In the first place, our export of agricultural produce bears a much larger proportion to our entire production, than the exports from England to this country of her manufactures does to the entire amount of her production, and of course exerts a greater influence on the price. In addition to this, the farmer cannot regulate his supply with the demand. The farmers are scattered all over the land, and they cannot by combination adjust the supply to the demand. In this country, where most of the land is cultivated by the labor of the owner of the soil, he has no other occupation than its cultivation, and he makes all he can without reference to the price. Indeed, when the price is low, so far from making less, he tries by increased production to make up for the smaller price. His rotation of crops is fixed, and he cannot well change them. His crops are pitched but once a year, and when pitched they must be saved. The quantity of the crop depends upon the seasons; and for that and the other reasons I have given, the farmer cannot adjust the supply to the demand. But it is otherwise with the manufacturers, particularly of England. They are congregated together in large towns, and they can

combine. The amount of their production does not depend upon the seasons, or other casualty. They do not own the labor, and are not compelled to find for it employment. Whenever, at any season of the year, they find the supply is likely to outrun the demand, and that they will lose more by the consequent fall of prices than they will gain by increased production, they can shorten work, curtail expenses at a day's warning, and adjust the supply to the demand. This constitutes the difference of the two cases.

Now, sir, let us turn to the facts, and see how they bear out this theory.

1st. Its effect on imports and exports. I take for the comparison the two years preceding and the two years following the adoption of the tariff of 1842. Of articles the growth, produce, and manufacture of the United States, we exported as follows. In 1843 the fiscal year was changed; for that year I have added a quarter in each of the following statements:

1840.....	\$113,895,634
1841.....	106,382,722
Two years.....	220,278,356
1843.....	\$77,793,783
“.....	25,931,261
1844.....	99,715,179
	203,430,123

Showing a falling off of \$16,848,233 in two years.

Let us now see how it has been with the produce of agriculture, including tobacco, cotton, flaxseed, hops, brown sugar, and indigo.

In 1840.....	\$92,545,339
In 1841.....	83,746,749
	176,292,088
In 1843.....	\$85,489,561
In 1844.....	79,938,410
	165,427,971

Falling off, \$10,864,117.

Agricultural produce exported, excluding tobacco, cotton, flaxseed, hops, brown sugar, and indigo.

In 1840.....	\$18,593,691
In 1841.....	16,737,462
	35,331,153
In 1843.....	\$13,659,469
In 1844.....	17,388,816
	31,048,285

Falling off, \$4,282,868.

Of wheat and flour alone we exported—

In 1840.....	\$11,779,098
In 1841.....	8,582,527
	20,361,625
In 1843.....	\$4,027,182
In 1844.....	7,232,898
	11,260,080

Falling off, \$9,101,545.

Now, sir, let us examine what effect this has had upon prices here; and as I have been dealing only with wheat, I shall confine myself to that, or rather to flour. I confine myself to flour, because the only statement I have of prices for a large number of years contain the price of flour alone.

The period from the end of 1824 to the 31st of December, 1833, when the first reduction under the compromise act took place, may with propriety be called the era of high duties. During these nine years, as appears by a table published by the United States Commercial and Statistical Register, the average price of flour was \$5 36. For the next nine years, when under the operation of the compromise act, the duties were constantly falling, the average was \$6 72. And the rise in the average of wheat, corn, &c., was about in the same proportion. In the summer of 1842 the present tariff law was enacted. The price of flour in 1841, the year preceding its enactment, was \$6 50. In 1843, the year succeeding its enactment, it was \$4 44. In 1844, it was \$4 50; and last year, until the partial failure of the European harvest was ascertained, it was about the same amount. Average for the three years succeeding the enactment of our present tariff, \$4 50. We have thus seen that from 1824, to this time, a period of twenty-two years, the price of flour has invariably risen and fallen as the rate of duties has risen or fallen. The length of this period precludes the idea that accidental causes have produced the result.

But the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Hudson,] argues that the northern manufacturers afford the best market for our agricultural produce. He goes into a calculation of the amount of their consumption, and insists, if we repeal the tariff, we will break down the manufacturers and destroy our best market.

Now, sir, I insist that the market afforded us by such manufacturers as are benefited by the tariff is very inconsiderable. A good deal of false reasoning upon this subject has grown out of the manner in which the late census was taken. All those engaged in manufactures and *trades* are put down under one head; the factory girl and the ship-carpenter are put together. In this manner, those engaged in manufactures are put down at 791,749. Now, of these a very large proportion are mechanics: joiners, ship-carpenters, smiths, masons, bricklayers, shoemakers, &c., none of whom are benefited, as I will presently show, by the tariff. I have made a calculation as to my own State, which establishes this beyond question. It is known that most, nay, nearly all, of our manufactures, properly speaking, are in Eastern Virginia; and yet in that part of the State there are 222,827 engaged in agriculture, and only 4,800 in manufactures and trades—upwards of 45 to 1. Whereas in Western Virginia, where there are scarcely any manufacturing establishments, there are 95,944 engaged in agriculture, and 16,676 in manufactures and trades—not quite 6 to 1. This shows that the greater proportion of those in Virginia included under the general head are engaged in trades. The reason of the difference in Eastern and Western Virginia is this: In Eastern Virginia our shoemakers, haters, blacksmiths, tailors, &c., have been driven from their employment by Yankee, not English

competition. Whereas Western Virginia, in consequence of its remoteness from the seaboard and the want of intercommunication, is compelled, to a much greater extent, to give employment to resident mechanics.

The same thing is apparent in Massachusetts. I have before me her late census, taken last year, by her own officers; and without going into a minute analysis of it, I assert that even in that State, the number of persons engaged in the mechanic arts, not benefited by the tariff, greatly exceeds the number engaged in manufactures, benefited by it. The following table, taken from that census, comprises nearly all those protected by the tariff:

Number of mills, manufactories, &c., and male and female operatives employed therein.

	Mills, &c.	Males.	Females.	Total.
Cotton mills, containing 817,483 spindles, and consuming 56,901,954 lbs. of cotton annually.....	302	6,393	14,497	20,710
Calico manufactories	14	1,887	166	2,053
Bleaching and coloring calico.....	9	—	—	211
Woollen mills, containing 514 sets of machinery, and consuming 15,387,448 lbs. of wool.....	178	3,901	3,471	7,372
Carpet mills, consuming 150,000 lbs. of cotton, and 1,786,238 lbs. of wool.....	17	715	319	1,034
Worsted manufactories.....	10	298	548	846
Hosiery establishments.....	17	53	185	238
Linen manufactories	3	93	99	192
Silk manufactories...	8	28	128	156
Total	555	14,278	19,323	32,812

Now, sir, there are, as shown by her census, engaged in boot and shoe making alone in Massachusetts, 22,199 males, and 18,678 females—total, 45,877. Upwards of ten thousand more than in all the manufactures to which I have referred. To show that these people have no interest in a tariff of protection, but, on the contrary, as consumers, are interested against it, nothing more is necessary than to refer to the import and export of boots and shoes:

Years.	Imported.	Exported.
1840	\$71,533	\$214,360
1841	49,902	193,583
1842	51,304	168,925
1843 (for three quarters of the year)	8,094	115,355
1844	27,482	204,000
	208,315	896,223
		208,315

Excess of exports over imports..... \$687,908

Thus it appears there is a large excess of exports over imports; and the imports consist principally of fancy articles, Parisian boots and shoes, which are imported for their fashion, without any reference to the price, and would be imported no matter how high the tariff. Of the exports, a large portion went to the British colonies. It thus appears that the shoemakers not only can command our

own market, but that they can compete with foreigners in their markets; and of course they want no tariff for protection. The prosperity of the mechanic depends upon that of the agriculturist, and whatever injures or benefits that pursuit injures or benefits him.

From all this it is apparent that it is absurd to claim all those engaged in manufactures and trades, as created consumers, by the tariff, of agricultural produce. Why, sir, no nation, blessed with a fertile soil and genial climate, which is well cultivated, can find in the persons, necessary to manufacture for it, consumers for its agricultural produce. One man engaged in manufactures will produce as much as twenty will consume; and one engaged in agriculture will produce as much as ten will consume. In this statement I do not pretend to speak with precise accuracy, but in round numbers, and I am not far from the mark. Even in England, who manufactures exclusively for her extensive colonies, and, to a great extent, for the world, who has a vast commercial marine, who has a large army to support, who has a large number of men of wealth following no industrial pursuit—"nati consumere furges"—even in England we find that consumption of agricultural produce has not far-outstripped production. Sir, if you were to build a Chinese wall around this nation, allow nothing to be imported, and manufacture everything for yourself, you would not find consumers for your agricultural produce. This can be established by a very short calculation. In 1840 the aggregate value of manufactured articles produced in this country was \$395,832,615. The number of persons employed was 791,749. In round numbers, about \$500 per head. Our import of manufactures of all sorts is about fifty millions annually. Suppose we should exclude importations altogether, and manufacture these articles ourselves, how many persons would it take to do it—and how much of agricultural produce would they consume? The average is \$500 per head; but this includes mechanics who do not produce so much in value per head as operatives employed in factories, and our imports are principally of articles produced by this latter class. It will therefore be seen that, in taking \$500 as the average production, I make a concession very much in favor of the manufacturers. But at that, it would take 100,000 persons to manufacture \$50,000,000—the entire amount of our import of manufactured articles. Suppose you allow an equal number for children too young to go into the factories, (and they go in very young,) and for those too old to be employed, (and they remain nearly as long as they live,) and you have 200,000. We have seen, in England, that the average consumption is about seventeen bushels of grain per head. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. HEDSON] shows that the consumption of wheat in this country is less than four bushels per head, which is less than is included in the English estimate. Still I will put down, for the consumption of this country, twenty bushels per head; and the consumption of 200,000 operatives would be 4,000,000 of bushels—much less than our present export. And to raise up this number of consumers, you have destroyed others more valuable. You

have destroyed your foreign commerce, and lost the consumers which it gives you. And I do not hesitate to say they are much more extensive consumers of our agricultural produce than all your manufacturers, benefited by a tariff of protection.

The persons connected with the commerce of the country afford us a very large market for our provisions; and it is known that the effect of the tariff policy is greatly to injure that pursuit. In the city of New York alone, there are three thousand carmen, with nearly twice that number of horses, principally dependent upon the foreign commerce of the country. In proportion to the size of the cities, there are as many in Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and the other towns. It may safely be said, that in the raising and subsisting of the horses engaged in this one branch, as much of the produce of the farmer is used, as is consumed by all the sickly inmates of every manufactory in the country, which is benefited by a tariff—to say nothing about the sixty thousand seamen, the large number of ship carpenters, stevedores, sail-makers, and persons engaged in the production of hemp and the manufacture of cordage. But this is a calculation which every one can make for himself, and I will not go minutely into it.

But the conclusive answer to the argument under consideration is, that we do not propose to destroy the manufactures. On the contrary, we think that such as the country is ripe for will flourish under a revenue tariff.

I do not desire (said Mr. B.) to be considered as the enemy of manufactures. I am friendly to them, and I will be glad to see them established, whenever the country is ripe for them. Whenever that is the case, they will be introduced. Until then they ought not to be introduced. My only fear is, that the protection which a tariff for revenue alone will afford, will cause many to be introduced prematurely. That protection is much greater than is generally supposed. The memorial of the New York merchants, presented to Congress at the extra session, says: "Twenty per cent. duty is a protection of no less than forty per cent. to domestic manufactures, because in addition to the duty, the expense of importation are about seven and a half per cent., and the profit to the importer is probably about twelve and a half per cent." Will not this afford protection enough? Are there any manufactures for which the country is ripe, that cannot prosper under a protection of forty per cent.? They flourished and made larger dividends, even during the latter period of the compromise act, than any other pursuit in the country. In making this statement I do not draw my inferences from unauthenticated sources. I hold in my hand a letter written by Thomas G. Cary, treasurer of the Hamilton Manufacturing Company, addressed on the 1st of December, 1844, to my honorable colleague, [Mr. PENDLETON.] It was designed, as it purports on its face, to disabuse the public mind as to the extent of manufacturing profits, and it is published by the manufacturers *themselves*, for that purpose. It contains the following table, giving the average dividends of the Lowell factories, "taken," as he says, "from their own books:"

Name of company.	Time of commencing.	Term of years.	Average of dividends.
Merrimack.....	1825.....	20 years.....	12 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Hamilton.....	1828.....	17 years.....	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Appleton.....	1829.....	16 years.....	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Lowell.....	1831....	14 years.....	9 per cent.
Suffolk.....	1833....	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.....	14 per cent.
Tremont.....	1833....	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.....	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Lawrence.....	1834....	11 years.....	7 per cent.
Boot.....	1838....	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.....	8 per cent.
Massachusetts.....	1841....	4 years.....	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

I have not included the allowance for loss of interest, and for fire insurance, amounting to a little more than one per cent., because these are charges which equally attach to all other pursuits. My own opinion is, that at this time the profits are generally much larger than these. But I have selected this statement because its authority cannot be disputed, and because the greater portion of the time it covers was during the operation of the compromise act. Well, sir, ought not the manufacturers to be satisfied with these profits? In what other pursuits are as large ones made? I can answer

for the farmers. It is difficult for us to make ends meet, to say nothing about profits. Sir, on an average, the farmers in my State do not clear two per cent. on their investment. And in making this statement I answer another argument, and that is, if we reduce the tariff, manufacturers will be thrown out of employment, and engage in agriculture, and become our competitors in place of our customers. They will scarcely give up ten per cent. to take two, and quit an employment yielding good profits, to engage in one which yields little or none, and which, as those gentlemen tell us, would be made still worse by the increased competition by this division of labor.

But I have already extended this argument further than I designed. In conclusion, permit me to say, let the expenditures of this Government be economical; the tariff reduced; the peace of the country preserved; and a course of prosperity opens before the country such as it has never before enjoyed.